

**00541**

**1962/10/20**

2136

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
 ( ) RELEASE  
 ( ) EXCISE  
 ( ) DENY  
 ( ) DELETE Non-Responsive Info  
 FOIA Exemptions  
 PA Exemptions

11-11-68

6-18 hours  
 or earlier

Political Action

1. Letter to GARCIA to be  
 delivered by Brazilian  
 Ambassador in Havana

Military Action

2. Statement to Polyzouin that  
 inconceivable build up continuing  
 and that those involved in Cuba  
 may suffer.

3. OAS request US act as agent  
 for OAS to continue surveillance  
 and help OAS evaluate threat.

4. UNICE House statement that offensive  
 build up continuing, dangerous and  
 provocative act which increases gravity  
 of situation. State instruct embassies  
 to follow up.

Responsibility

State

State

White House

White House

5. Consult with (i.e., advise concerning  
 latest intelligence, range of possible US  
 actions, and results expected) the following:  
 a. W. France, FRO  
 b. Canada

5. Advise CINCEUR concerning  
 possible alternative US actions,  
 likely timing, results expected,  
 and schedule of notifications  
 and consultations with UNICE  
 governments; ask for suggestions  
 about USG action for immediate  
 NATO readiness.

~~SECRET~~  
 11-11-68

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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MR Cases Only:  
 EO Citations

IS/FRC/CDR 11/11/68 12-18-92

( ) CLASSIFY as ( ) S or ( ) C OADR  
 ( ) DOWNGRADE TS to ( ) S or ( ) C OADR

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

REVIEWED BY Moskowitz DATE 2/10/68  
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5-12

16. Inform Washington Ambassadorial Group

State

5-3

19. Dispatch cable guidance to US Embassies and USIA posts in Europe.

18. Presidential order to White House strike.

5-6

20. Notification of Turkish and Italian Prime Ministers that Soviets might attempt some counter-action with regard to Jupiters and to remain calm.

State

21. SACEUR asks NATO governments for authority to place forces on alert at 5-hour

22. Inform of nature of operation:

State

a. All other NATO governments  
b. MAC

23. Air strike against all known IRBM and IRBM sites followed immediately by low level attack have follow-up strike in the early for release.

DOD

24. Notify Dobrynin of attack

State

25. Notify Ambassadorial representative at UN

State

26. Briefing of Latin Ambassadors

State

~~TOP SECRET~~ SECRET, OADR

S-hour

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27. Briefing of White Ambassadors

State

28. Call for Security Council Meeting  
first afternoon

State

29. Briefing of Congressional Leadership

White House,  
Senate, DOD

S 1

30. Brief, public announcement of fact  
of attack and preliminary results.

White House

S 4

31. Inform Standing Group, Military Committee  
and UK, French and FRG Ambassadors of details  
of results.

State, DOD

32. Inform Congressional Leadership of details  
of results

State, DOD

33. Presidential announcement of attack and  
results

White House

34. Leaflet drop in Cuba  
stressing fact that attack  
linked to Soviet bases;  
weakness of Soviet strength  
in Cuba.

DOD

35. Briefing in friendly capitals in  
Western Europe

State

36. Briefing for CENTO

State

37. Continue military reconnaissance  
measures to include deployment  
recommended by SACEM and agreed  
by the United States.

DOD

~~TOP SECRET~~ SECRET, ONDR

SECRET  
-TOP SECRET

3 of 14

38. Meeting of OAS Instituted by Organ  
of Consultation Meeting

State

39. Meeting of Security Council at  
which US representative would pursuant  
to Article 24 of the Charter inform the  
Security Council of the action taken.

State

SECRET, OADR

## ADVANTAGES OF THIS COURSE

1. Carries out President's pledge to eliminate offensive threat to US and Hemisphere from Cuba and avoids any erosion of US momentum and position. The pledge carried out shows that US has will to fight and to protect vital interests (of great importance vis-a-vis Berlin).
2. Since directed at offensive weapons, keeps issue focused on Soviet nuclear presence in Cuba in defiance of OAS and majority of Security Council.
3. Sharp, possible one time action, may carry smaller risks of further escalation than a series of confrontations over a period of time. Soviet decision to risk major war unlikely to be decisively affected by this action in an area non-vital to the Soviets.
4. Prompt action will avoid danger of a growth of hands-off Cuba movement throughout Latin America which might make it increasingly difficult to strike at offensive weapons. Present willingness of Latin Americans to support strong action probably cannot be maintained indefinitely.
5. Signals clearly that US not prepared to bargain bases in Cuba for positions in Berlin, NATO and elsewhere.
6. It could demonstrate to Cubans, Castro and others, the weakness of Soviet position in Cuba. In the absence of a strong Soviet reaction in defense of Cuba, we would start the process of disenchantment and disaffection requisite to undermining Castro and Cuban reliance on the Soviet Union. We would also weaken any tendencies to rely on Soviets elsewhere in world.
7. Removes a military threat to US from Cuban territory.
8. Denies Khrushchev a possible cheap victory through successful maintenance of offensive weapons in Cuba.
9. Pressure preceding strike may be sufficient to accomplish objective without execution of attack - especially if a suitable cut is available to Khrushchev and Castro.

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1. This action may force Khrushchev to react strongly and could result in some type of war. Khrushchev will not order launch of a missile from Cuba unless he is ready for war essentially on other grounds. There is greater likelihood of a riposte in kind. However, it is unlikely that the risks of major war are greater than through escalation of blockade.

2. There is remote possibility that some local Soviet commander in Cuba may order firing of a missile.

3. Adverse effect on US image of initiation of use of force against a small country. This can be minimized by making attack selective and focused solely on Soviet offensive weapons. At same time there would be positive increments to our image from demonstration of clear willingness to take on the Soviets in protection of our vital interests.

4. Unless carefully handled could damage long-range US-Cuban relations.

5. May not totally eliminate offensive weapons thus calling for follow up attacks and/or invasion, unless full and unlimited international inspection is agreed to.

SECRET, ORDER

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